This paper asked the question of whether the behavior and compensation of interlocked executives and non-independent board of directors are consistent with the hypothesis of governance problem or whether this problem is mitigated by implicit and market incentives. It then analyzes the role of...

Our simple model features agents heterogeneous in skill and risk aversion, incomplete financial markets, and redistributive taxation. In equilibrium, agents become entrepreneurs if their skill is sufficiently high or risk aversion sufficiently low. Under heavier taxation, entrepreneurs are more...

Do equity investors care about pay dispersion and income inequality? We address this question by examining equity markets' reaction and investors' portfolio rebalancing in response to the first-time disclosure by U.S. public companies of the ratio of CEO to median worker pay in 2018. We find...

Combining the daily productivity records of individual manufacturing workers with stock market data, we find that worker productivity is negatively associated with market overnight returns. This effect is instantaneous, and the economic loss is quantitatively important. Mechanism analysis...

This paper uses individual-level data linking stock investments to work performance to examine how changes in stock market wealth affect worker output. Exploiting large return variations over time and across investors, we document a 10% increase in monthly stock investment returns is associated...

Using the Great Recession of 2007-2009 as a quasi-natural experiment, we find that CEOs' work experience is significantly related to firm stock performance while their endowed traits play a limited role in the recession. No CEO characteristics matter during the pre-recession period. CEOs who...

II address the way agency incentives evolve, from listed equity with low liquidity to highly liquid stocks with active informed speculators. I conclude that, as the informativeness of stock price about the manager's actions improves, less weight needs to be given to both equity and non-price...

Using the details of vesting terms, we document that stock options granted in high sentiment periods tend to have shorter vesting period/duration, and are more likely to vest completely or have a significantly larger fraction vested within one year of the grant date relative to low sentiment...