Using a large sample of U.S. acquiring and non-acquiring firms and covering a broad sample of transactions, we examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on CEO compensation during 1993-2006, a period of intense M&A activity. We alleviate endogeneity concerns through dynamic panel...

Using a sample of target firms that do not delist from the stock market after a majority takeover, we investigate the effect of the target CEO's departure on their firms' subsequent financial performance. We find that CEO departures have a positive effect on the target firms' long-run operating...

This internet appendix provides additional results that complement the main results of the paper. In the first part, we show the results of the self-selection model that incorporates the observation that target firms may self-select not to delist from the stock markets after takeovers. In the...

I review recent takeover research which advances our understanding of "who buys who" in the drive for productive efficiency. This research provides detailed information on text-based definitions of product market links between bidders and targets, the role of the supply chain and industrial...

This paper examines how accounting transparency and corporate governance interact. Firms with better governance are associated with higher abnormal returns, but even more so if they also have higher transparency. The effect is largely monotonic — it is small and insignificant for opaque firms...

In this paper, we use call option prices to identify synergies and news from merger and acquisition (M&A) transaction announcements. We find that M&A announcements result in large and approximately equal gains to the bidder and the target on average, with the combined gains being large enough to...

This study examines the contradictory predictions regarding the association between the premium paid in acquisitions and deal size. We document a robust negative relation between offer premia and target size, indicating that acquirers tend to pay less for large firms, not more. We also find that...

We study the impact of accelerated vesting of equity awards on takeovers, whereby the restricted stock and/or stock options of the target CEO immediately vest and become unrestricted upon the close of the acquisition. We find that takeover premiums are significantly larger when the target CEO...

We find that units are more likely to adopt poisonpills at the time of a spinoff if their parents have anti-takeover provisions in place. In addition, the probability that a spinoff unit adopts a poisonpill is negatively related to outside block ownership, but positively related to the size of...

This paper proposes and tests the hypothesis that takeover vulnerability contributes to short-term price reversal by motivating investors to trade speculatively and also by making investors demand immediacy in their trades. That is, takeover vulnerability is hypothesized to amplify two channels...