In a first attempt to apply the global games methodology to signalling games, Ewerhart and Wichardt (2004) analyse a beer-quiche type signalling game with additional imperfect information about the preferences of the receiver. Their approach allows them to dismiss the unreasonable pooling on...

The appearance of a Brownian term in the price dynamics on a stock market was interpreted in [De Meyer, Moussa-Saley (2003)] as a consequence of the informational asymmetries between agents. To take benefit of their private information without revealing it to fast, the informed agents have to...

To aid in the description and estimation of the tremendous recent growth in the collaborative economy, we provide a model for the dynamics of sharing, subject to fixed costs and imperfect price formation. The sharing economy comprises a set of infinitely lived, heterogeneous suppliers, who take...

This paper develops a framework to study general equilibrium implications for an economy in which agents are allowed to have dynamically inconsistent time and risk preferences. This framework accommodates, but is not limited to, the following settings: (1) non-exponential discounting; (2)...

Theories of predatory trading assume exogenous market depth and/or exogenous distress of the prey. By endogenizing both, I obtain a new feedback loop between liquidity and predatory trading. On the one hand, limited depth helps predators move prices to push the prey into distress. On the other...

Using a model without conflicts of interest and with identical information available to equity analysts, we show that bias and herding in their stock recommendations occur due to incentives provided by relative performance evaluation and top awards. Furthermore, these incentives also lead to...

We numerically determine the equilibrium trading strategies in a Continuous Double Auction (CDA). We consider heterogeneous and liquidity motivated agents, with private values and costs that trade sequentially in random order under time constraints and are not aware of the type of the other...

We examine the strategies of different types of investors (the insider, the information follower, and the price follower) who have asymmetric information about future news events and how these strategies affect stock prices. We show that stock price jumps occur when the insider receives accurate...

Suppose the value of a firm is endogenously determined by a manager's costly effort. We call this manager a distinguished player if he also can trade shares of the firm on a market. Arbitrage-free asset pricing theory suggests that the equilibrium market price reflects the value increasing...

We model a scenario in which there are three types of investors: fundamentalists, speculators, and trend-followers and an intermediary who cares about his reputation. Fundamentalists are rational investors with long horizons who are interested in the dividend stream. Speculators are rational...