Anticompetitive mergers increase competitors' profits, since they reduce competition. Using a model of endogenous mergers, we show that such mergers nevertheless may reduce the competitors' share-prices. Thus, event-studies can not detect anti-competitive mergers.

This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite-horizon Markov-perfect duopoly dynamics with ongoing demand uncertainty. All entrants serving the model industry incur sunk costs, and exit avoids future fixed costs. We focus on the unique...

The recent merger between US Airways and American Airlines was approved by federal and state antitrust authorities, after the merging parties agreed to divest slots and gates at certain “constrained” airports to low cost carriers. By analyzing the stock-market returns of rival airlines, we...

This paper demonstrates that when an industry faces potential entry and this threat of entry constrains pre-entry prices, cost and conduct are not identified from the comparative statics of equilibrium. In such a setting, the identifying assumption behind the well-established technique of...

The Supreme Court recently held that in reverse-payment settlements of drug patent disputes, anticompetitive effects can be inferred if the reverse payment exceeds the patent holder's anticipated litigation costs, absent some offsetting justification. Application of this standard is problematic...

Competitors privately sharing price intentions is universally prohibited under antitrust/competition law. In contrast, there is no common well-accepted treatment of competitors privately sharing prices. This paper shows that firms sharing prices leads to higher prices. Based on this theory of...

This study shows that mergers’ price effects can vary seasonally. I document countercyclical price increases due to the Coors and Miller merger, which is consistent with models of coordinated pricing that predict lower equilibrium prices during high-demand states

This paper considers the effects of raising the cost of entry for a potential competitor on infinite-horizon Markov-perfect duopoly dynamics with ongoing demand uncertainty. All entrants serving the model industry incur sunk costs, and exit avoids future fixed costs. We focus on the unique...

We investigate the effects of fragmentation in equity trading on the quality of the trading outcomes, specifically volatility, liquidity and volume. We use panel regression methods on a weekly dataset following the FTSE350 stocks over the period 2008-2011, which provides a lot of cross-sectional...

The allocation of shares on crowd-investing-platforms is best described by the phrase "first come, first served". An entrepreneur who sells corporate equity to a "crowd" of investors on such a platform chooses a fixed investment target before the investment period begins. Once the aggregate...