This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the role of blockholders (large shareholders) in corporate governance. We start with the underlying property rights of public corporations; we discuss how blockholders are critical in addressing free-rider problems and why, like...

Permanent or long-term large shareholders have different governance incentives and mechanisms from institutional investors. Liquidity could facilitate either cutting and running by large shareholders or, alternatively, increased monitoring. Using an exogenous shock to liquidity in China, we...

This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the channels through which blockholders (large shareholders) engage in corporate governance. In classical models, blockholders exert governance through direct intervention in a firm's operations, otherwise known as “voice.” These...

Higher CEO incentives can both reduce the conflict between management and shareholders, thereby making blockholder monitoring less necessary (“substitution effect”), and increase the ability to punish recalcitrant CEOs through blockholder’s exit, thereby making blockholder monitoring more...

In this paper, we consider the corporate governance challenge of protecting outside investors in listed, controlled firms. European jurisdictions are supposed to be more veteran and skilled in dealing with these firms in comparison to the U.S. But we argue that outside investors in European...

A change in the index selection rules of Deutsche Börse provides a unique opportunity to investigate the drivers behind the decision to a bolish dual-class shares. As of June 2002, selection is based on the market capitalization of the free-float of the more liquid share class rather than the...

We investigate the relation between corporate governance characteristics of hostile takeover targets and the choice to employ 'harmful' resistance that is not perceived as being motivated by shareholders' interests. We find that harmful resistance is associated with firms where managers have...

The impact of the announcement of a takeover bid has been widely tested in foreign literature. Therefore, the main goal of this paper is to research the impact of the announcement of a takeover bid on the share price movements in the Croatian capital market and whether the results are consistent...

This paper examines the impacts of dividend policy and ownership structure on stock price volatility in the Vietnamese market. The study also tests for the moderating effect of foreign/state ownership on the dividend policy–price volatility relation. The authors use a comprehensive panel...

I quantify private benefits of control, and their impact on stock prices, by estimating a structural model of optimal shareholding using data on the ownership dynamics of Italian public companies. The results show that controlling shareholders generally have positive and persistent impact on...