This paper analyzes why corporate governance matters for stock returns if the stock market prices the underlying managerial agency problem correctly. Our theory assumes that strict corporate governance prevents managers from diverting cash flows, but reduces incentives for managerial effort. In...

This paper proposes a theoretical model that incorporates corporate governance into the basic CAPM, where corporate governance affects the disutility of managerial effort and the possibility of managers to divert company resources. It shows that corporate governance affects firms’ stock...

Non-financial performance measures, such as Environmental, Social, and Governance (“ESG”) measures, are potentially leading indicators of firms' financial performance. I draw on the prior academic literature and the concept of ESG materiality to develop new corporate governance and ESG...

An influential emerging literature, led by Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021a), documents strong correlations between unscaled raw emissions and both stock returns and operating performance. We re-examine that data, using a sample of 2,729 U.S. firms from 2005-2019, and conclude that the associations...

Does managerial entrenchment create or destroy shareholder value? This Article presents both theory and evidence that the answer to this question is not monolithic, but rather depends on factors that vary greatly with the macroeconomic climate, such as firm profitability, takeover frequency, and...

This paper is the first long-run historical analysis of stock market development and minority shareholder protection in France (1852-2007). For this purpose, we constructed a unique time series of shareholder protection indices (anti-director rights and securities law) and relied on triangulated...

I collect 1,186 reported estimates of long-run value creation from 49 studies and present the first meta-analysis of the literature on shareholder activism and its effect on firm value in the longrun. This synthesis is necessary because shareholder activism is increasing over time and across...

A primary concern in mergers and acquisitions is the risk the deal may be cancelled before it is completed. We document that this ``interim risk" varies asymmetrically with the aggregate market return. Deals paid in cash tend to be renegotiated when the market rises but cancelled when the market...

This paper examines the impact of takeover law enforcement on corporate acquisitions. We use the European Takeover Directive as a natural experiment, which harmonizes takeover law across countries, while leaving its enforcement to the discretion of individual countries. We exploit this...