We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastically evolving stakes. Our motivating example is dynamic limit pricing in markets with persistent demand shocks. An incumbent is privately informed about its costs, high or low, and can deter a potential entrant by setting prices strategically....

The current research assesses the risks commonly attributed to the presence of HFT in the context of different market structures deployed by the U.S. exchanges. In particular, we find that, by design, the so-called “normal” exchanges have the lowest market quality, including the highest...

Extending Milgrom and Roberts (1982) we present an infinite horizon entry model, where the incumbent(s) may use the current price to signal its strength to deter entry. We show that, due to the importance of entrants' types on the post-entry duopoly/oligopoly profits, the incumbent(s) may want...

This paper studies the dynamics of emerging excess returns in a industry-by-industry context. Differently from the recent financial literature, which mainly focuses on 'total market indexes', we perform a standard ex-post empirical analysis aimed at capturing the industries' contribution to...

The welfare implications of vertical mergers have been a subject of disagreement for decades. Similar to horizontal mergers, economists need to weigh the efficiency gains relative to the market power concerns when considering the competitive effects of vertical mergers. However, in vertical...