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Debt holder monitoring and implicit guarantees: Did the BRRD improve market discipline?

Cutura, Jannic Alexander - 2020

This paper argues that the European Unions Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) improved market discipline in the European bank market for unsecured debt. The different impact of the BRRD on bank bonds provides a quasi-natural experiment that allows to study the effect of the BRRD...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012653448

Does Subordinated Debt Discipline Banks? Empirical Evidence of Market Discipline in Europe

Schürk, Daniel - In: Junior Management Science (JUMS) 4 (2019) 2, pp. 228-240

This thesis provides a differentiated answer to the question whether subordinated debt disciplines bank's risk-taking behavior. I investigate the conditions and applicability of market discipline through subordinated debt instruments by critically reviewing the state of research. Relating to the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528869

Should the marketing of subordinated debt be restricted/different in one way or the other? What to do in the case of mis-selling?

Götz, Martin R.; Tröger, Tobias - 2016

An important prerequisite for the efficiency of bail-in as a regulatory tool is that debt holders are able to bear the cost of a bail-in. Examining European banks' subordinated debt we caution that households may be investors in bail-in able bonds. Since households do not fulfil the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011442595

Italian bank crisis: Flexible application of BRRD rules, or a bailout in disguise?

Famfollet, Jan; Sankotová, Eliška - In: Review of Economic Perspectives 20 (2020) 2, pp. 109-135

The economic and financial crisis of the year 2008 highlighted the need for banking sector regulation via the creation of the banking union. The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) represents an important milestone in the formation of the banking union. It is supposed inter alia to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012384141

MREL and TLAC: The Path from Bail-out to Bail-in for Banks' Creditors in the European Union

Best, Stefan; Read, Oliver - In: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 50 (2017) 3, pp. 337-362

In the wake of the financial market crisis new rules on banking recovery and resolution of systemic banks have been enacted in order to facilitate the bail-in of banks' creditors. Banks will be required to maintain sufficient amounts of own funds and bail-inable debt called Minimum Requirement...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014522672