This paper models the optimal riskiness of structured securitization deals. The deals are put together by “banks” that hold an equity piece of the deal and can exercise strategic options over the risk put into the deals. The banks face a tradeoff between the benefits of risk-taking now and...

We build a market equilibrium model of loan securitization as an alternative explanation of the cause of the recent Financial Crisis where there was initially deteriorating loan quality but coupled with aggressive securitization, and later investors “flight to quality” and market...

This study explores whether and how bank characteristics affect general risk-taking and tail risk of Too-Big-to-Fail (TBTF) and non-TBTF banks differently. We show that TBTF banks’ investment decisions drive their risks, while sources of funding drive risks of other banks. Contradicting the...

This paper analyzes the risk-taking behavior of financial intuitions that have guarantees (e.g., banks with deposit insurance or Government Sponsored Enterprises with implicit guarantees) and/or institutions that find it beneficial to develop a reputation for not taking risk. For instance, banks...

Systemic risk is a key concern for central banks charged with safeguarding overall financial stability. In this paper we investigate how systemic risk is affected by the structure of the financial system. We construct banking systems that are composed of a number of banks that are connected by...