This paper studies a newly compiled data set of annual balance sheets of more than 11,000 commercial banks across 17 advanced economies since 1870. The new data expose the central role of large banks for credit cycles and financial instability throughout modern financial history and the...

I revisit the Diamond-Dybvig model of liquidity insurance in the presence of hidden trades. The key result is that in this environment deposit-taking banks are not necessary for the efficient provision of liquidity. Mutual funds are constrained efficient when supplemented with the same...

The “too big to fail” institutions are a widespread concern, especially in the financial world. The author aims to determine if banking markets have a tendency in creating “too big to fail” institutions or if they created randomly, by uncorrelated determinants. The importance of the...

We investigate two competing explanations for commercial bank distress during financial crises: liquidity shortages and solvency concerns. If liquidity shortages cause distress, a lender of last resort can help by providing funds to banks having trouble rolling over short-term debt and facing...

This paper studies how financial intermediation varies across banks. Bank size is a first-order determinant of banks' capital structure in the cross-section. Largest banks have the lowest capital-to-asset ratio and the lowest ratio of Tier-1 capital against risk-weighted assets. These large...

We explore how large and small banks make funding decisions when the government provides system-wide bailouts to the financial sector. We show that bank size, purely on strategic grounds, is a key determinant of banks' leverage choices, even when bailout policies treat large and small banks...

To provide maturity transformation, banks need a deposit base – deposits that could be, but are not, withdrawn most of the time and are, thus, used for long-termlending. In a global-games environment, we show that a higher deposit base protects banks against panic runs. As depositors become...

This paper compares the consequences of equity injections into banks with purchases of corporate and government bonds in a financial crisis situation using a New Keynesian model in which non-financial firms predominantly take non-market-based debt from banks instead of issuing securities. Our...

We develop a simple model that looks at the incentives of private banks to behave prudentially and undertake costly efforts to lower the probability of bankruptcy or having to be bailed out by a lender of last resort. Government regulators can force banks to increase efforts beyond the privately...

Government-nanced bank restructuring programs, occasionally costing up to 50% of GDP,are commonly used to resolve banking crises. We analyze the Ramsey-optimal paths of bankrecapitalization programs that weigh recapitalization benets and costs under dierent nancingoptions. In our model bank...