We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find...

We analyze the impact of incentive mechanisms embedded in executive remuneration contracts on the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a panel of US and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to estimate how bonus payments and option holdings impact the level of bank...

Post 2008, the market-to-book ratios of European and US banks have diverged markedly. We use panel regressions to investigate the determinants of the M/B ratios of 112 European and US banks. We show that the underperformance of European banks is mainly driven by non-performing loans and by the...