We investigate whether sovereign bond holdings of European banks are determined by a risk-return trade-off. Using data between 2011 and 2018 for 75 European banks, we confirm that banks exhibited risk-taking behavior during the sovereign debt crisis, e.g., due to moral suasion. In the period...

This study investigates the net effects of sectoral loan concentration on banks in Hong Kong. Research in this area remains inconclusive, due to the potential trade-off between concentration risks and specialisation gains. Our empirical results, based on a regulatory panel dataset of licensed...

The paper examines how loan portfolio diversification drives bank returns, mainly focusing on the conditioning roles of business models and market power in this nexus. We employ a sample of Vietnamese commercial banks from 2008 to 2019 to perform regressions in the dynamic panel models with the...

The objectives of the study are to document the various determinants of EPF and NPS as a retirement plan and to suggest strategies for their efficient management to optimise the returns. Based on websurvey, a sample size of 170 respondents, the empirical results have indicated that EPF lacks...

The equity of too-big-to-fail banks could be deemed less risky due to implicit government guarantees. However, such guarantees could also amplify a moral hazard problem that induces large banks to take excessive risk. If such risk is mispriced by the market due to the increased complexity of...

This paper examines the relationship between executive cash compensation and company performance for a sample of large UK companies, focusing in particular on the financial services industry, since incentive misalignment has been blamed as one of the factors causing the global financial crisis...

Bank executives' compensation has been widely identified as a culprit in the Global Financial Crisis, and reform of banker pay is high on the public policy agenda. While Congress targeted its reforms primarily at bankers' equity-based pay incentives, empirical research fails to show any...

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find...

We analyze the impact of incentive mechanisms embedded in executive remuneration contracts on the risk choices made by bank CEOs. For a panel of US and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to estimate how bonus payments and option holdings impact the level of bank...

This study examines whether and how the terms of CEO compensation contracts at large, publicly traded commercial banks between 1994 and 2006 influenced, and were influenced by, the risk-profiles of these firms. We find evidence linking contractual risk-taking incentives, which we proxy with...