This paper investigates various theories explaining banks' overbidding in the fixed rate tenders of the European Central Bank (ECB). Using auction data from both the Bundesbank and the ECB, we show that none of the theories can on its own explain the observed overbidding. This implies that the...

Recent U.S. legislation (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act) allows commercial banks to enter merchant banking, i.e. hold equity in non-financial firms. A stylised auction-theoretic model is developed to investigate the effects of bank equity stakes in firms on the competition in bank loans. The main...

We analyze auctions of unsecured money market deposits of firms to banks via a FinTech platform. In each auction, only the firm observes the banks and their interest rate bids and decides where to deposit its funds. We observe that deposit interest rate bids increase monotonically with bank risk...

Open banking is a policy initiative that encourages lending market competition by allowing borrowers to freely share data with any financial institutions. We investigate resource allocation efficiency under open banking. In our setting, banks compete in common-value auctions where they obtain...

We use a unique data set that comprises each bank’s bids in the Eurosystem’s main refinancing operations and its recourse to the LOLR facility (a) to derive banks’ willingness-to-pay for liquidity through a one-week repo and (b) to show that a bank’s willingness-to-pay is a good...

We examine how intermediary capitalization affects asset prices in a framework that allows for intermediary market power. We introduce a model in which capital-constrained intermediaries buy or trade an asset in an imperfectly competitive market, and we show that weaker capital constraints lead...

We use a unique data set that comprises each bank's bids in the Eurosystem's main refinancing operations and its recourse to the LOLR facility (a) to derive banks' willingness-to-pay for liquidity through a one-week repo and (b) to show that a bank's willingness-to-pay is a good indicator for...

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) resolves insolvent banks using an auction process in which bidding is multidimensional and the rule used to evaluate bids along the different dimensions is proprietary. Uncertainty about the scoring rule leads banks to simultaneously submit...

We study specialized lending in a credit market competition model with private information. Two banks, equipped with similar data processing systems, possess "general" signals regarding the borrower's quality. However, the specialized bank gains an additional advantage through further...

We propose a spatial competition model to study banks' strategic responses to the asymmetric Spanish geographic deregulation process. We find that once the geographic deregulation process finishes, inter-regional mergers between savings banks are optimal whenever the economies of scale...