We use a newly constructed narrative measure of regulatory bank capital requirement tightening events (Eickmeier et al., 2018) to examine their effects on household income and expenditure inequality in the US. Income and expenditure inequality both decline (the latter decline being slightly less...

We use a newly constructed narrative measure of regulatory bank capital requirement tightening events (Eickmeier et al., 2018) to examine their effects on household income and expenditure inequality in the US. Income and expenditure inequality both decline (the latter decline being slightly less...

We use a newly constructed narrative measure of regulatory bank capital requirement tightening events (Eickmeier et al., 2018) to examine their effects on household income and expenditure inequality in the US. Income and expenditure inequality both decline (the latter decline being slightly less...

Based on a non-linear equilibrium model of the banking sector with an occasionally binding equity issuance constraint, we show that the economic impact of changes in bank capital requirements depends on the state of the macro-financial environment. In ”normal” states where banks do not face...

European supervisors aggressively requested more capital at large banks. That may cut credit to the economy. We confirm that especially larger banks cut loans while less-significant banks partly offset that credit drop. Moreover, we identify nasty spillovers from that interaction. Specifically,...

What is the impact of a sudden and sizeable increase in bank capital requirements on the lending activity by directly affected banks and by non-affected non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)? To answer this question, we apply a difference-in-differences methodology around the capital exercise...

We examine the assertion that ratings from the ratings agencies that explicitly assume governmental support for Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) translate into lower spreads and a funding cost advantage for those G-SIBs. We analyze whether the market over the past 14 years in fact...

We investigate whether or not market discipline on banking firms changed after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010. If market discipline is improved, we should see a lower discount for size on yield spreads, particularly for banks identified as...