One of the most pressing questions in the aftermath of the financial crisis is how to deal with systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs). The purpose of this paper is to review the recent literature on systemic risk and evaluate the regulation proposals in the Basel III framework...

We investigate why only some banks use regulatory arbitrage. We predict that banks wanting to be riskier than allowed by capital regulations (constrained banks) use regulatory arbitrage while others do not. We find support for this hypothesis using trust preferred securities (TPS) issuance, a...

We investigate whether or not market discipline on banking firms changed after the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010. If market discipline is improved, we should see a lower discount for size on yield spreads, particularly for banks identified as...

This paper provides an overview of the dramatic changes in the UK banking sector over the 1989–2013 period, seen through the lens of a newly assembled database built from banks' regulatory reports. This database, which we refer to as the Historical Banking Regulatory Database (HBRD), covers...

We find that banks subject to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) create less liquidity per dollar of assets in the post-LCR period than banks not subject to the LCR, in part because LCR banks make fewer loans. However, we also find that LCR banks are more resilient, as they contribute less to...

In this paper we investigated the impact of global capital adequacy norms on the asset portfolios of Indian banks. This research question is important in the Indian context as the Indian banks have adopted global regulatory norms in integration with the already existing domestic policy...

Whether and to what extent tougher bank regulation weighs on economic growth is an open empirical question. Using data from 28 manufacturing industries in 50 countries, we explore the extent to which cross-country differences in bank liquidity and capital levels were related to differences in...

We introduce a general equilibrium model to analyze the interactions between liquidity regulations and banks' investment in complex assets. Complexity improves bank liquidity in good times but heightens vulnerability to runs during crises. Banks underinvest in complex assets when liquidity...

We take issue with claims that the funding mix of banks, which makes them fragile and crisis-prone, is efficient because it reflects special liquidity benefits of bank debt. Even aside from neglecting the systemic damage to the economy that banks' distress and default cause, such claims are...

We investigate the risk taking incentives of "stressed banks" - the banks that are subject to annual regulatory stress tests in the U.S. since 2011. We document that stress tests effectively encourage prudent investment from stressed banks through regulatory monitoring, but also provide them...