ownership is positive for IBs. For the moderating test, we find that effective board structure provides more incentives to the …

) suggesting that perverted incentives from variable pay packages encourage powerful bank managers to excessive risk-taking acting … against shareholders' benefit …

shareholders and managers' conflicting interests. However, the Board has an important role in defining the executives' compensation …

incentives, and higher hidden pay, whereas greater transparency of executive compensation has the opposite effects. Although … reputational concerns can induce boards to choose compensation contracts more favorable to shareholders, we show there is a … threshold beyond which stronger reputational concerns harm shareholders. Similarly, excessive pay transparency can harm …

representatives on the board can become beneficial from the shareholders' perspective. This benefit occurs because the bank … managerial compensation. The model predicts that shareholders benefit from bank representatives on the board of directors when …

notion that managerial incentives and board monitoring are substitutes for each other. The substitution effect is especially … pronounced when firms have poorly incentivized managers. We find that firms with a larger number of banking relationships are …