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We find that the public disclosure of regulators' supervisory actions changes their enforcement behavior. Using a novel sample of enforcement actions and orders (EDOs) and the setting of the 1989 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA), which required public...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850258
This paper studies the role banking supervision plays in improving access to credit for minorities by investigating how enforcement decisions and orders (EDOs) affect the bank borrower base. We find that, after an EDO's termination, banks significantly increase residential mortgage lending to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013406092
. Using hazard analysis, we show that bank failure is about 45% less likely in the year leading up to an election. Political … control (i.e. lack of competition) can explain all of this average election year fall in the hazard rate. In particular, we … simultaneous control of the upper- and lower-house of the state legislature (i.e. complete control) heading into an election …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013064907
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We document a strong political cycle in bank credit and industry outcomes in Turkey. In line with theories of tactical redistribution, state-owned banks systematically adjust their lending around local elections compared with private banks in the same province based on electoral competition and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012428972
Public announcement of formal enforcement actions against banks for safety and soundness reasons may enhance effective depositor monitoring or cause depositors to overreact, leading to disruptive runs. We test these competing hypotheses, using hand-collected data on enforcement actions and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012951948
We assess the effect of formal enforcement actions against banks for safety and soundness reasons on punished banks' deposits, and then examine whether this effect is caused by demand-side or supply-side forces. To this end, we use hand-collected data on enforcement actions, and bank-quarter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012901476
This paper reexamines whether investors value payout and why. I study abnormal stock returns around regulatory enforcement actions that restrict bank dividends and repurchases. Market reactions are significantly worse for enforced banks that pay out than for those that do not. Withstanding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012902627
We investigate the effect of regulatory enforcement actions on banks' reputation by estimating the effect of non-compliance with laws and regulations among lead arrangers on the structure of syndicated loans. Consistent with a regulatory reputational stigma, a punished lead arranger increases...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903395