Both borrowers and lenders can be socially responsible (SR). Ethical banks commit to financing only ethical projects, which have social profitability but lower expected revenues than standard projects. Instead, no credible commitment exists for SR borrowers. The matching between SR borrowers and...

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...

This paper is the first investigation of the interplay between dividends and risk taking in banks. I examine the role of dividends as a risk-shifting mechanism that can exacerbate moral hazard, controlling for standard determinants of dividends in nonfinancial firms. My main findings show that...

We construct a model of bank's financing under moral hazard. The bank as an intermediary borrows funds from the investors (depositors) to channel them to the entrepreneurs who run the projects of the firm. The firm's project return is risky, which is the source of the moral hazard. Also the...

A large body of literature has blamed moral hazard behaviour by banks, for triggering the recent global financial crisis. Many reasons have been cited for such incentive distortion, e.g. the originate-to-distribute approach, regulatory capital arbitrage or the possibility of systemic bailouts....

This paper empirically analyzes risk shifting in the banking industry. Specifically, we study whether risk shifting took place in the European Union's banking sector in 2002–2009. Taking into account the components of the financial structure of banks, we also identify the type of risk...

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...

The relation between dividends and bank soundness has recently drawn much attention from both academics and policy makers. However, the existing literature lacks an investigation of the relation between dividends and bank risk taking. I find a positive relation between default risk and payout...

Scholars and regulators often maintain that extended shareholder liability reduces bank risk-taking. Prior to the Great Depression, double liability on bank shareholders was the predominant institutional framework aimed to constrain moral hazard. We examine whether increased shareholder...

This paper analyzes the effect of the removal of government guarantees on bank risk taking. We exploit the removal of guarantees for German Landesbanken which results in lower credit ratings, higher funding costs, and a loss in franchise value. This removal was announced in 2001, but...