Banks face two moral hazard problems: asset substitution by shareholders (e.g., making risky, negative net present value loans) and managerial rent seeking (e.g., investing in inefficient “pet” projects or simply being lazy and uninnovative). The privately-optimal level of bank leverage is...

This paper develops a structural credit risk model of a bank that issues deposits, shareholders' equity, and fixed or floating coupon bonds in the form of contingent capital or subordinated debt. The return on the bank's assets follows a jump-diffusion process, and default-free interest rates...

An analysis of the impact of depositor preference laws on the cost of debt capital for banks and on the value of FDIC deposit guarantees. The authors find that depositor preference laws increase the value of uninsured deposit claims and reduce the size of the FDIC subsidy, but will not affect...

A model of bank asset sales in which information asymmetries create the incentive for unregulated banks to originate and sell loans to other banks, rather than fund them with deposit liabilities. Private information implies that bankers can fund local loans only to the extent that their capital...

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the determinants of the leverage ratios (the book value of liabilities divided by the total of the book value of liabilities' and the market value of equity) for 232 bank holding companies for December 1986, June 1987, and December 1987. Many...

An investigation of the effects of interest rate and credit risk on optimal capital structure and investment decisions. The authors show that with no uncertainty in interest rates, capital regulation will reduce the risk of the bank's assets, but that under interest rate uncertainty, the impact...

An intermediation model that examines the efficiency and welfare implications of banks' required capital-asset ratio and of the regulations that limit - and in some countries forbid - banks' investments in equity to a certain proportion of each firm's capital. ; A look at how episodes of...

Most models of deposit insurance assume that the volatility of a bank's assets is exogenously provided. Although this framework allows the impact of volatility on bankruptcy costs and deposit insurance subsidies to be explored, it is static and does not incorporate the fact that equityholders...

The impacts of deposit insurance and forbearance on the costs and value of uninsured deposits and equity capital are shown under three regimes.

An examination of the impact of increased capital requirements on bank portfolio behavior, finding that although the variance of earnings and the incentive to increase leverage are reduced with risk- and leverage-related interest rates, the impact of increased capital requirements on portfolio...