An analysis of the impact of depositor preference laws on the cost of debt capital for banks and on the value of FDIC deposit guarantees. The authors find that depositor preference laws increase the value of uninsured deposit claims and reduce the size of the FDIC subsidy, but will not affect...

An examination of the empirical impact of depositor preference legislation (DPL) on resolution type and resolution costs for commercial banks. It focuses on the impact of state DPL statutes, using FDIC and call-report data on resolution costs and types for all operating FDIC-BIF insured...

An explanation of the relationship between interbank exposure and the too big to fail doctrine, with an examination of the interbank exposure of U.S. banks between March 1984 and March 1990.

An analysis of the issues surrounding bank resolution costs, looking at failures from 1986 to 1992 and including proxies for fraud, off-balance-sheet risk, brokered deposits, and both regional and size effects. Evidence suggests there was a significant lag between the realization and recognition...

A study that models the regulatory decision to close a bank as a call option. A two-equation model of bank failure that treats closings as regulatorily timed events is compared with two single-equation models for accuracy.

The development of a model of large-bank failures that studies insolvency and failure simultaneously and that recognizes economic, political, and bureaucratic constraints faced by regulators.

This paper develops a structural credit risk model of a bank that issues deposits, shareholders' equity, and fixed or floating coupon bonds in the form of contingent capital or subordinated debt. The return on the bank's assets follows a jump-diffusion process, and default-free interest rates...

The author develops a model that examines the regulator's role in the bank failure decision process, with attention given to the regulator's constraints and incentives.

The author develops an empirical model to value a financial institution's capital for regulatory purposes, which when estimated for a sample of failed and nonfailed institutions, reveals the need for a market-value accounting approach to capital.

A clarification of the distinction between risk and failure in assessing bank diversification, showing how increasing bank size may increase bank risk even though it lessens the probability of failure and lowers the expected loss.