An analysis of the impact of depositor preference laws on the cost of debt capital for banks and on the value of FDIC deposit guarantees. The authors find that depositor preference laws increase the value of uninsured deposit claims and reduce the size of the FDIC subsidy, but will not affect...

An examination of the empirical impact of depositor preference legislation (DPL) on resolution type and resolution costs for commercial banks. It focuses on the impact of state DPL statutes, using FDIC and call-report data on resolution costs and types for all operating FDIC-BIF insured...

An explanation of the relationship between interbank exposure and the too big to fail doctrine, with an examination of the interbank exposure of U.S. banks between March 1984 and March 1990.

An analysis of the issues surrounding bank resolution costs, looking at failures from 1986 to 1992 and including proxies for fraud, off-balance-sheet risk, brokered deposits, and both regional and size effects. Evidence suggests there was a significant lag between the realization and recognition...

A study that models the regulatory decision to close a bank as a call option. A two-equation model of bank failure that treats closings as regulatorily timed events is compared with two single-equation models for accuracy.

Everyone recognizes the need to have a credible resolution regime in place for financial companies whose failure could harm the entire financial system, but people disagree about which regime is best. The emergence of the parallel banking system has led policymakers to reconsider the dividing...

One of the changes introduced by the sweeping new financial market legislation of the Dodd–Frank Act is the provision of a formal process for liquidating large financial firms—something that would have been useful in 2008, when troubles at Lehman Brothers, AIG, and Merrill Lynch threatened...

An empirical study using an early-warning bank failure prediction model and call-report data to predict deterioration in a bank's condition.

Under depositor-preference laws, depositors' claims on the assets of failed depository institutions are senior to unsecured general-creditor claims. As a result, depositor preference changes the capital structure of banks and thrifts, thereby affecting the cost of capital for depositories....