We present strong evidence of supra-competitive pricing of debtor-in-possession (DIP) loans to large firms in Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Over-collateralized and with super-priority, strong covenants, rollups, and debtor-funded monitoring costs, these loans are almost risk-free. Nonetheless, loan...

We show that when banks and borrowers share the same audit firm, borrowers receive lower interest rates, after controlling for potentially confounding director connectedness. The common auditor effect is observed only for opaque borrowers, and is greatest when the same audit engagement office...

Large net loan charge-offs are frequently associated with large decreases in nonperforming loans and large increases in loan loss provisions, inducing a V-shaped relation between loan loss provisions and nonperforming loan changes. Failure to model the asymmetry attributable to net loan...

Banks collect private information for the purpose of monitoring borrowers. However, we have little evidence on the sources of private information they use. This study investigates whether and how banks use private information about regulatory oversight of public disclosures through the SEC...

We find that senior loan lender control is positively associated with a firm's corporate bond yield spread at issuance. A one standard deviation change in the number of covenants on the strictest loan on a firm's balance sheet is associated with a 15 basis points higher yield spread at bond...

Large net loan charge-offs are frequently associated with large decreases in nonperforming loans and large increases in loan loss provisions, inducing a V-shaped relation between loan loss provisions and nonperforming loan changes. Failure to model the asymmetry attributable to net loan...

This paper studies the effect of senior lender control, as measured by bank loan covenants, on the pricing of new bond issues. We find a U-shaped relation between the number of financial covenants on a firm's loan contract and the bond yield spread. Our results suggest that bondholders initially...

We show that banks with high environmental, social, and governance (ESG) ratings issue fewer mortgages in poor neighborhoods—in quantity and dollar amount—than banks with low ESG ratings. This lending disparity is observed at both the county and census tract level and worsens in disaster...

We study the effects of analyst coverage on syndicated lending. We hypothesize that analyst research alleviates information asymmetries between lead arrangers and participant lenders within a syndicate, increasing the participants’ credit supply and reducing the required loan interest spread....

We show that when banks and borrowers share the same audit firm, borrowers receive lower interest rates, after controlling for potentially confounding director connectedness. The common auditor effect is observed only for opaque borrowers, and is greatest when the same audit engagement office...