Private firms often rely on insider lending, e.g. by banks. Insider lending is based on lending relationships that typically involve intertemporal loan pricing: losses from early years are recovered by information rents in later years, stemming from private information the inside lender has...

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers' access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is...

We analyze the relationship between bank size and risk-taking under the New Basel Capital Accord. Using a model with imperfect competition and moral hazard, we show that the introduction of an internal ratings based (IRB) approach improves upon flat capital requirements if the approach is...

We present a banking model with imperfect competition in which borrowers’ access to credit is improved when banks are able to transfer credit risks. However, the market for credit risk transfer (CRT) works smoothly only if the quality of loans is public information. If the quality of loans is...

This paper provides a comprehensive theoretical and empirical analysis of "creditor rights" and "information sharing" throughout over 1.8 million public and private firms in Europe. We show that many of the outcomes associated with greater levels of creditor rights can be obtained with higher...

We examine over crisis and non-crisis periods whether banks have a structurally different propensity to draw on the central bank's overnight lender-of-the-last-resort (LLR) facility. Our findings suggest that in particular those banks that are structurally more exposed to liquidity shocks, have...