This paper attempts to find out whether better quality of investor protection matters for the effect of capital ratio on loan growth of large EU banks in 1996-2011. We focus on several measures of the quality of investor protection with a proven track record in the banking literature, i.e.:...

This study investigates the non-discretionary determinants of bank loan loss provisions in Africa after controlling for macroeconomic fluctuation, financial development and investor protection. We find that non-performing loans, loan-to-asset ratio and loan growth are significant...

The theory of political benefits argues that politicians use state-owned banks for political purposes such as obtaining and maintaining political support. While the theory of social welfare goal argues that state-owned banks exist to counter market failures and finance socially important...

This study examines whether state-owned banks face political pressure and whether the improvement in political institutions alleviates this pressure. The theory of political benefits argues that politicians use state-owned banks for political purposes such as obtaining and maintaining political...

Rapid development of the domestic private sector in communist China and Vietnam has been offered as evidence against a large literature that claims a solid legal infrastructure is required for the financial sector to contribute to economic development. One component of the counterargument holds...

We document a direct channel through which financial institutions contribute to the net worth of members of the U.S. Congress, particularly those sitting on the finance committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives. These individuals report greater levels of leverage and new...

We explore whether banks use loans as a tool for political influence. Using close elections as our setting, we show that firms linked to members of Congress receive lower interest rates on new loans, which are also larger and have fewer covenants. Such firms, however, do not experience...