Firms with greater shareholder rights have higher risk-shifting incentives. Such firms should have more concentrated loan syndicates to ensure more intensive monitoring. In the United States, the second generation antitakeover laws reduced the shareholder rights significantly. We find that loan...

We find that increases in lending by Japanese Government Owned Bank (GOB) during the crisis in early 1990's had a strong incremental impact on firm level investment, especially for credit constrained firms. Firms have better future accounting performance when their investment is associated with...

This paper provides a comprehensive examination of the time series behavior of relationship banks around and during borrower distress. Relationship and outside loans have similar interest rates during distress, and even two years prior to distress. Relative to outside loans in distress,...

We show that executive ownership is a significant driver of the demand for credit following credit expansion policies. Our focus on credit demand is in contrast to most studies that have focused on credit supply factors such as bank-capital. Our identification exploits the large and unexpected...

We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for both endogenous compensation and leverage fully rationalizes...