We use the EU stress tests and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to study the consequences of supervisory disclosure of banks' sovereign risk exposures. We test the idea that a mandatory one-time disclosure induces an increase in voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk in the following...

We use the EU stress tests and the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis to study the consequences of supervisory disclosure of banks' sovereign risk exposures. We test the idea that a mandatory one-time disclosure induces an increase in voluntary disclosures about sovereign risk in the following...

EU politicians pressured the IASB to change the accounting rules for financial assets at the peak of the financial crisis in October 2008. The new rules enabled banks to forgo the recognition of unrealized fair value losses through reclassifications. This paper puts the ensuing regulatory relief...

This paper examines how a regulatory design with multiple supervisory agencies translates into firm-level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. We exploit the fact that banks are subject to equivalent risk disclosure rules under securities laws (IFRS 7) and banking...

We examine how the presence of multiple supervisory agencies affects firm-level compliance in form and substance with disclosure regulations. This analysis is important because coordination problems among regulators are frequently present in practice but often overlooked in academic research. We...

Regulators frequently relax accounting rules during a financial crisis as a means of regulatory forbearance. The new accounting options provide banks with an opportunity for an accrual-based increase in their regulatory capital. The use of such an accounting option helps reduce the costs of...