This paper investigates regulations for a bank that is covered by deposit insurance in a dynamic setting where bankruptcy entails social costs. Regulatory policy operates through rules governing the bank's capital structure and asset allocation that may be adjusted each period. Throughout, the...

Corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions differs considerably from general corporate governance. For financial institutions the scope of corporate governance goes beyond the shareholders (equity governance) to include debtholders, insurance policy holders and other...

In the post-financial crisis regulatory reforms emphasis has been placed on creating recovery and resolution frameworks for banks, which ensure that the costs of failure are primarily born by shareholders, instead of taxpayers and the wider economy. Supervisors have (or will have) extensive...

Corporate governance of banks differs considerably from general corporate governance. For banks the scope of corporate governance goes beyond the shareholders (equity governance) to include debtholders (debt governance). From the perspective of bank supervision debt governance is the primary...

Banks are special, and so is the corporate governance of banks and other financial institutions as compared with the general corporate governance of non-banks. Empirical evidence, mostly gathered after the financial crisis, confirms this. Banks practicing good corporate governance in the...

On 16th November 2009, SUERF, CEPS and the Belgian Financial Forum coorganized a conference "Crisis management at cross-roads" in Brussels. All papers in the present volume are based on contributions at the conference and the SUERF Annual Lecture which followed the event.

This paper examines the cash management practices of firms during the period of increased FDIC insurance on noninterest-bearing accounts. While the Transaction Account Guarantee Program and Dodd-Frank Act were intended to help banks by preventing deposit withdrawals, they also seem to have...

This paper examines the impact of performance, board independence, and regulatory evaluations on CEO turnover in a recent sample of banks. Similar to earlier studies, the results suggest weak performance and greater board independence are positively related to CEO turnover. In addition, poor...

Based on the hand-collected board structure data of 277 listed banks across 55 countries, and the bank regulation and supervision database compiled by the World Bank, this paper provides the first cross-country assessment of the impacts of bank regulations on board independence of banks. In line...