To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous structural two-equations model that specifies the probability of a bailout and banks’ risk taking.We identify the effect of expected bailout probabilities on risk taking using exclusion restrictions...

To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous structural two-equations model that specifies the probability of a bailout and banks' risk taking.We identify the effect of expected bailout probabilities on risk taking using exclusion restrictions...

This paper investigates (i) whether growth and profitability persist in banking firms, (ii) whether the level and volatility of growth and profitability are bank-size dependent, and (iii) the relationship between growth and profitability of a bank. Using a dynamic panel model estimated by GMM...

We examine systemic risk in the Chinese banking system by estimating the conditional value at risk (CoVaR), the marginal expected shortfall (MES), the systemic impact index (SII) and the vulnerability index (VI) for 16 listed banks in China. Although these measures show different patterns, our...

We examine systemic risk in the Chinese banking system by estimating the conditional value at risk (CoVaR), the marginal expected shortfall (MES), the systemic impact index (SII) and the vulnerability index (VI) for 16 listed banks in China. Although these measures show different patterns, our...