We propose a methodology for measuring the market-implied capital of banks by subtracting from the market value of equity (market capitalization) a credit-spread-based correction for the value of shareholders' default option. We show that without such a correction, the estimated impact of a...

Can a major financial crisis trigger changes in a bank's risk-taking behavior? Using the 2008 Global Financial Crisis as a quasi-natural experiment and a difference-in-differences approach, I examine whether the worst crisis-hit Russian banks - the banks that have strong incentives to...

The recent financial crisis has raised several questions with respect to the corporate governance of financial institutions. This paper investigates whether risk management-related corporate governance mechanisms, such as for example the presence of a chief risk officer (CRO) in a bank's...

In this paper, we examine whether the structure of the chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation package can explain default risk and performance in bank holding companies (BHCs) during the recent credit crisis. Using a sample of 371 BHCs, we show that in 2006 lower holdings of inside debt...

This paper investigates (1) how the composition of executive compensation is related to a bank's incentive to take excessive risk, (2) whether executive compensation in larger banks, especially the too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks, induces more severe moral hazard behavior, and (3) how the relation...

In this paper we empirically analyze the determinants of bank default risk (measured by the banks' CDS spreads) for European banks during the period 2008-2018. We examine the effect of (1) bank business model characteristics, (2) sovereign default risk and (3) ECB monetary policy. We disentangle...

We find that the level of bank herding in real estate loans during boom period is substantially higher than the level of bank herding in commercial and industrial loans or consumer loans. More importantly, we find that bank herding significantly increases systemic risk. In particular, herding in...

Can a major financial crisis trigger changes in a bank’s risk-taking behavior? Using the 2008 Global Financial Crisis as a quasi-natural experiment and a difference-in-differences approach, I examine whether the worst crisis-hit Russian banks – the banks that have strong incentives to...