Presentation by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for The Seoul International Financial Forum 2009, Seoul, Korea, April 15, 2009

Remarks by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, to the Financial Stability Institute, Bank for International Settlements, St. Petersburg, Russia, May 24, 2011

Presented by Eric S. Rosengren, President and Chief Executive Officer, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, for the Bank of Korea and Bank for International Settlements Seminar, Household Debt: Implications for Monetary Policy and Financial Stability, Seoul, Korea, March 27, 2008

This paper provides evidence that the Federal Reserve has an informational advantage over the public that can be exploited to improve activist monetary policy. The informational advantage derives from the Fed?s role as a bank supervisor, and it is shown to be of sufficient duration to be...

This study investigates the direct link between regulatory enforcement actions and the shrinkage of bank loans to sectors likely to be bank dependent. We focus on New England because that region has experienced both the widespread application of formal regulatory actions and substantial...

Banking crises have continued to emerge in recent years, contributing to severe economic contractions in Japan, Russia, and Southeast Asia. In response, international organizations have advocated enhanced market discipline, encouraging countries to improve disclosure. One reason so little...

Whether central banks should play an active role in bank supervision and regulation is being debated both in the United States and abroad. While the Bank of England has recently been stripped of its supervisory responsibilities and several proposals in the United States have advocated removing...

Recently, several central banks have lost their bank supervisory responsibilities, in part because it has not been shown that supervisory authority improves the conduct of monetary policy. This paper finds that confidential bank supervisory information could help the Board staff more accurately...