Public announcement of formal enforcement actions against banks for safety and soundness reasons may enhance effective depositor monitoring or cause depositors to overreact, leading to disruptive runs. We test these competing hypotheses, using hand-collected data on enforcement actions and...

We assess the effect of formal enforcement actions against banks for safety and soundness reasons on punished banks' deposits, and then examine whether this effect is caused by demand-side or supply-side forces. To this end, we use hand-collected data on enforcement actions, and bank-quarter...

We investigate the effect of regulatory enforcement actions on banks' reputation by estimating the effect of non-compliance with laws and regulations among lead arrangers on the structure of syndicated loans. Consistent with a regulatory reputational stigma, a punished lead arranger increases...

We show that borrowing firms benefit substantially from important enforcement actions issued on U.S. banks for safety and soundness reasons. Using hand-collected data on such actions from the main three U.S. regulators and syndicated loan deals over the years 1997-2014, we find that enforcement...

Formal enforcement actions issued against banks for violations of laws and regulations related to safety and soundness can theoretically have both positive and negative effects on the terms of lending. Using data on such enforcement actions issued against U.S. banks, we show that they have a...

This paper investigates the role of banking supervision, measured in terms of enforcement outputs (i.e. on-site audits and sanctions), in containing bank risk-taking. First, a direct relationship is considered, while the combined effect of effective supervision and banking regulation in the form...