This paper examines the negative externalities that may occur when a large bank fails, describes the nature of those externalities, and explores whether they may be greater in a case involving a large cross-border banking organization. The analysis suggests that the chief negative externalities...

We study the optimal precision of public information disclosures about banksíassets quality. In our model the precision of information a§ects banksí cost of raising funding and asset proÖle riskiness. In an imperfectly competitive banking sector, banksístability and social surplus are...

We examine the economic consequences of a rule designed to improve consumers' understanding of mortgage information. The 2015 TILA-RESPA Integrated Disclosures (TRID) rule simplifies the disclosures provided to consumers, reducing their information processing costs and increasing lenders'...

This paper argues that stress tests encompassing the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be designed to improve welfare. We develop a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion to show that a banking supervisor can create value when he commits to disclose the stress-testing...

What does the general public know about banking supervision? What objectives does the public think bank supervisors should pursue? We investigate these issues using a survey among Dutch households. First, we find that the public's knowledge about banking supervision is far from perfect. We also...

The regulatory use of banks' internal models makes capital requirements more risk-sensitive but invites regulatory arbitrage. I develop a framework to study bank regulation with strategic selection of risk models. A bank supervisor can discourage arbitrage by auditing risk models, and implements...

Using a survey among more than 2,000 consumers in the Netherlands, we examine the drivers of trust in the financial sector supervisor. Trust in De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) declined sharply during the financial crisis and has not yet completely recovered. Our results suggest that consumers’...

The game-theoretical analysis of this paper shows that stress tests that cover the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be performed by institutional supervisors to improve welfare. In a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion we show that a banking authority can create value...

The game-theoretical analysis of this paper shows that stress tests that cover the entire banking sector (macro stress tests) can be performed by institutional supervisors to improve welfare. In a multi-receiver framework of Bayesian persuasion we show that a banking authority can create value...