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This paper briefly reviews papers presented at a JFI-Washington University Conference on the post-crisis evolution of banks and financial markets that are appearing in a special issue of the JFI. The major themes represented by the papers in this issue have significantly advanced our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012899653
This paper reviews the papers that were presented at a conference at Washington University in St. Louis, a subset of which were published in a special issue of The Journal of Financial Intermediation. The papers cover a wide range of issues on how banks and financial markets have evolved since...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012852557
This paper develops a theory that explains why financial crises follow profitable lending booms. When agents exhibit the "availability heuristic" and there is a long period of banking profitability, all agents — banks, their investors and regulators — end up in an “availability cascade,”...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013025188
This paper briefly reviews papers presented at a JFI-Washington University Conference on the post-crisis evolution of banks and financial markets that are appearing in a special issue of the JFI. The major themes represented by the papers in this issue have significantly advanced our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012922918
We empirically examine the Capital Purchase Program (CPP) used by the US gov- ernment to bail out distressed banks with equity infusions during the Great Recession. We find strong evidence that a feature of the CPP – the government’s ability to ap- point independent directors on the board of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012584933
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The role that banks play in screening and monitoring their borrowers is well understood. However, these bank activities are costly and unobservable, thus difficult to contract upon. This introduces the possibility of shirking and leads to the question – who monitors the monitor? Financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808016