We build a moral hazard model to study incentives of financial intermediaries (shortly, bankers) facing a leverage-insurance trade-off in their investment choice. We demonstrate that the choice is affected by two recent transformations of the financial ecosystem bankers inhabit: (i) the rise of...

In dieser Studie wird die Höhe von Risikoprämien in Industrieländern, die Rolle von Quantitative Easing und die Bedeutung der veränderten Bankenregulierung nach der Bankenkrise sowie im Kontext des Brexit untersucht.Vor dem Hintergrund der Geldpolitik in den USA, in GB und in der Eurozone...

Business cycles imply liquidity risks for banks. This paper explores how these risks influence bank lending over the cycle. With forward-looking banks, lending cycles, credit booms and busts, or suppressed and highly fragile bank systems can emerge, depending on the magnitude of liquidity risks....