Life insurers' odds of being placed under regulatory control (for example, conservatorship or receivership) during the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009 increased with deteriorating fundamentals at a much higher rate than during normal times or during the previous recession. However, no...

Life insurers' odds of being placed under regulatory control (for example, conservatorship or receivership) during the financial crisis years of 2008 and 2009 increased with deteriorating fundamentals at a much higher rate than during normal times or during the previous recession. However, no...

In 2018, the Insurance Distribution Directive (IDD) was fully implemented by all EU member states. It intends to harmonize the insurance market, provide the right incentives for the agents and protect the consumers. But why? The core business of the banking sector makes it necessary for a...

European Union (EU) countries offer a unique experience of financial regulatory and supervisory integration, complementing various other European integration efforts following the Second World War. Financial regulatory and supervisory integration was a very slow process before 2008, despite...

This paper investigates the long-run recovery experience of U.S. banks that received capital infusions under the Capital Purchase Program (CPP), a part of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Based on a dynamic recovery model, our results show that recovering CPP banks tended to be in...

Banks and other financial institutions which were too-big-to-fail (TBTF) played a central role during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009. The present article lays out how misguided policies enabled banks to grow both in size as well as in complexity and therefore acquire TBTF status,...

We propose a novel conceptual approach to transparently characterizing credit market outcomes in economies with multi-dimensional borrower heterogeneity. Based on characterizations of securities' implicit demand for bank equity capital, we obtain closed-form expressions for the composition of...

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which the design of regulatory banking and insurance capital standards (Basel II/III and Solvency II) provide incentives for endogenously‐generated destabilising effects to the financial system. The literature has identified three areas...

For globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs) with U.S. headquarters, we find large post-Lehman reductions in market-implied probabilities of government bailout, along with big increases in debt financing costs for these banks after controlling for insolvency risk. The data are consistent...

The potential dark side of government guarantees, introduced to mitigate concerns about financial stability during economic downturns, is that they may create incentives for excessive risk-taking. In a low-interest rate environment, this effect maybe even stronger as financial institutions try...