I study the relation between shadow banking and financial stability in an economy in which banks are susceptible to self-fulfilling runs and in which government-backed deposit insurance is limited. Shadow banks issue only uninsured deposits while commercial banks issue both insured and uninsured...

In November 2021, the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG) issued a report analyzing the rapid expansion and growing risks of the stablecoin market. PWG’s report determined that stablecoins pose a wide range of potential hazards, including the risks of inflicting large losses...

We study capital regulation in a dynamic banking model with non-maturing deposits. Optimal withdrawals of depositors make bank deposits endogenously long-term. Capital regulation addresses deposit dilution but is subject to a time-inconsistency problem. Comparing the optimal policies of...

This paper examines common regulation as cause of interbank contagion. Studies based on the correlation of bank assets and the extent of interbank lending may underestimate the likelihood of contagion because they do not incorporate the fact that banks have a common regulator. In our model, the...

We study ex post efficient policy responses to a run on the banking system and the ex ante incentives these responses create. We show that the efficient response to a run is typically not to freeze all remaining deposits, since doing so imposes heavy costs on some individuals. Instead, once a...

This paper addresses the topic regarding the desirability of competition in banking industry. In a model where banks compete on both deposit and loan markets and where banks can use monitoring technology to control entrepreneurs' behavior, we investigate three questions: what are the effects of...

In early 2009 the EU increased the minimum deposit insurance limit from €20,000 to €100,000 per bank account. Italy was the only country with a limit already set to €103,291 from 1994. To evaluate the impact of the new directive we run a diff-in-diff analysis and compare the bank-size...

Recent literature suggests that higher capital requirements for banks might lead to a socially costly crowding out of deposits by equity. This paper shows that additional equity in banks can help to crowd in deposits. Intuitively, as banks have more equity and become safer, the cost of deposit...

We investigate the impact of banks disclosure on their ability to attract more deposit in Europe for the period 1989-2013. The bank disclosure provides tools to help depositors to exert there governance onto banks manager to align managers incentives with the one of depositors.We introduced as...

We provide a welfare comparison of the two types of banking regulation commonly used to address moral hazard problems, deposit rate ceilings and minimum capital requirements. It is well understood that interference with the price mechanism may lead to inefficiencies -- in the case of a deposit...