The Central Bank of Ireland and SUERF organised a joint conference in Dublin on 20th September, 2010 on the general theme of Regulation and Banking after the Crisis. In the best traditions of SUERF, the programme included papers and presentations from the three main constituencies of SUERF:...

We examine banking competition when deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks become feasible. We show that the risk allocation is efficient, provided that banks are not bailed out. In this case, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors. The private sector insures the...

We examine banking competition when deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks become feasible. We show that the risk allocation is efficient, provided that banks are not bailed out. In this case, banks may shift part of the risk to depositors. The private sector insures the...

In this paper, we develop a discrete choice framework to quantify the economic benefits of payments modernization in Canada. Focusing on Canada's large-value transfer system (LVTS), we first estimate participants' preferences for liquidity cost, payment safety and the network effect by...

We characterize how U.S. global systemically important banks (GSIBs) supply short-term dollar liquidity in repo and foreign exchange swap markets in the post-Global Financial Crisis regulatory environment and serve as the "lenders-of-second-to-last-resort". Using daily supervisory bank balance...

We examine whether the economy can be insured against banking crises with deposit and loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We study banking competition and show that the private sector insures the banking system through such contracts, and banking crises are avoided, provided that...

The Central Bank of Ireland and SUERF organised a joint conference in Dublin on 20th September, 2010 on the general theme of Regulation and Banking after the Crisis. In the best traditions of SUERF, the programme included papers and presentations from the three main constituencies of SUERF:...

We examine financial intermediation when banks can offer deposit or loan contracts contingent on macroeconomic shocks. We show that the risk allocation is efficient if there is no workout of banking crises. In this case, banks will shift part of the risk to depositors. In contrast, under a...

We investigate a banking system subject to repeated macroeconomic shocks and show that without deposit rate control, the banking system collapses with certainty. Any initial level of reserves will delay the collapse but not avoid it. Even without a banking collapse, the economy still converges...