In recent years there has been growing attention on the risks posed by climate change. One relevant question for financial stability is to which extent the materialisation of transition risks emerging from the sudden implementation of climate change mitigation policies would impact the...

Using banks' internal models for regulatory purposes, while aimed at making capital requirements more accurate, invites regulatory arbitrage. I show how the strategic use of risk models can be avoided by penalizing banks with low risk-weights when they suffer abnormal losses. As defaulting banks...

This paper proposes a quantitative multi-sector DSGE model with bank failure and firm default to study the interactions between bank regulation and climate policy. Households value the liquidity of deposits, which are protected by deposit insurance. Banks collect deposits and issue equity to...

We document that lenders react to domestic climate policy stringency by increasing cross-border lending. We use granular fixed effects to control for loan demand and an instrumental variable strategy to establish causality. Consistent with regulatory arbitrage, the positive effect decreases in...

Federal banking regulators are grappling with how to confront the threats posed by climate change. There are increasingly loud calls for regulators to adjust the “risk-weights” used to calculate banks’ minimum capital requirements based on how exposed their counterparties are to...

In the presence of macroeconomic shocks severe enough to threaten the liquidity or solvency of the banking system, the regulator can rely on the funds concentration effect to save long-term investment projects. Some banks are forced into bankruptcy with the result that other banks obtain more...

This paper offers a framework for regulating internalities. Using a simple economic model, we provide four principles for designing and evaluating behaviorally-motivated policy. We then outline rules for determining which contexts reliably reflect true preferences and discuss empirical...

This paper studies optimal second-best corrective regulation, when some agents/activities cannot be perfectly regulated. We show that policy elasticities and Pigouvian wedges are sufficient statistics to characterize the marginal welfare impact of regulatory policies in a large class of...

This paper studies optimal second-best corrective regulation, when some agents/activities cannot be perfectly regulated. We show that policy elasticities and Pigouvian wedges are sufficient statistics to characterize the marginal welfare impact of regulatory policies in a large class of...

In this paper we study the effect of institutional reform on the decision to hold risky assets at the extensive and the intensive margin. We therefore make use of the natural experiment of German Division and Reunification and, based on savings bank customer data from German savings banks, study...