We study the welfare implications of self-fulfilling bank runs and liquidity requirements, in a growth model where banks, facing persistent possible runs, can choose in any period a run-proof asset portfolio. In this framework, runs distort banks' insurance provision against idiosyncratic...

We study a novel mechanism through which systemic risk, in the form of self-fulfilling runs, forces the banks to hoard liquidity. To this end, we develop an environment where banks offer insurance to their depositors against both idiosyncratic and aggregate real uncertainty, by holding a...

Does the level of deposits matter for bank fragility and efficiency? In a banking model with endogenous bank runs and a consumption-saving decision, we show that the level of deposits has opposite effects on bank fragility depending on the nature of bank runs. In an economy with panic-driven...

How important is it to distinguish relative risk aversion (RRA) from the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) to study banks' provision of liquidity insurance and the effectiveness of deposit freezes against depositors' panic runs? To answer these questions, I develop a Diamond-Dybvig...

We propose a novel theory of banks' liquidity management and financial fragility. Banks hold liquidity and an illiquid productive asset, thereby engaging in maturity transformation, and insure their depositors against idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. However, strategic complementarities in...

Does the level of deposits matter for bank fragility and efficiency? In a banking model with endogenous bank runs and a consumption-saving decision, we show that the level of deposits has opposite effects on bank fragility depending on the nature of bank runs. In an economy with panic-driven...

We study how regulation shapes the interaction between financial fragility and bank liquidity management and propose a rationale for the complementarity between bank recovery and resolution planning. To this end, we analyze an economy in which a benevolent resolution authority sets a bank...