During normal times, strengthening the financial stability of banks is associated with contradictory effects on returns. In this paper, we establish that liquidity and capital ratios had a positive impact on bank returns during the first three years following the global financial crisis. Our...

The quite recent (2007-2009) global financial crisis (GFC), which was caused by a mix of business, regulatory, supervisory, and macroeconomic (in terms of sub-optimal fiscal and/or monetary policies) failures, had a negative impact both on the financial system – with the failure, through the...

Operational risk is fundamentally different from all other risks taken on by a bank. It is embedded in every activity and product of an institution, and in contrast to the conventional financial risks (e.g. market, credit) is harder to measure and model, and not straight forwardly eliminated...

The market-based SRISK measure introduced in Brownlees and Engle (2015) is used to measure the level of systemic risk in Danish banks for the period 2005-15. We find that SRISK was a very good predictor of which banks that needed public capital injections during the financial crisis of 2007-09....

In the wake of the global financial crisis that erupted in 2008, there has been extensive commentary and regulatory focus on the 'Too Big to Fail' issue. In this paper, we survey the proposed solutions and regulatory initiatives that have been undertaken. We conduct a longitudinal analysis of...

Can a major financial crisis trigger changes in a bank's risk-taking behavior? Using the 2008 Global Financial Crisis as a quasi-natural experiment and a difference-in-differences approach, I examine whether the worst crisis-hit Russian banks - the banks that have strong incentives to...

We estimate a panel error correction model for loan loss provisions, using unique supervisory data on flow of funds into and out of the allowance for loan losses of 25 Dutch banks in the post-2008 crisis period. We find that these banks aim for an allowance of 49% of impaired loans. In the short...

CoCo's (contingent convertible capital) are designed to convert from debt to equity when banks need it most. Using a Diamond-Dybvig model cast in a global games framework, we show that while the CoCo conversion of the issuing bank may bring the bank back into compliance with capital...

In deciding whether to roll over a loan, a relationship bank that has imperfect private information about its borrowers faces a trade-off. It wants to avoid rolling over a loan to a bad firm so as to safeguard its reputation as an effective monitor. However, refusing to roll over a loan to a...

We study the transmission of bank distress to nonfinancial firms from 34 countries during the 2007-2009 financial crisis using systemic and bank-specific shocks. We find that bank distress is associated with equity valuation losses and investment cuts to borrower firms with the strongest lending...