This paper is motivated by the implementation of the new banking supervision structure in the European Union (EU) and the possible conflict of interest between monetary policy and the supervision authority within the European Central Bank (ECB). The empirical analysis considers the relationship...

This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication between the supervisors is...

In the context of current debates about the proper form of prudential regulation and proposals for the imposition of liquidity and capital ratios, the paper examines Hyman Minsky’s work as a consultant to government agencies exploring financial regulatory reform in the 1960s. As the...

In the light of the recent financial market turmoil, this paper focuses on liquidity risk management from the point of view of both supervisory authorities and large financial institutions. This research aims at pointing out the main differences between national regulations and supervisory...

Banking union is the most ambitious European project undertaken since the introduction of the single currency. It was launched in the summer of 2012, in order to send the markets a strong signal of unity against a looming financial fragmentation problem that was putting the euro on the ropes....

The question of why some countries suffer from crises, while some others can escape from them, is challenging. Empirical evidence suggests that countries with stronger financial institutions are more durable to the wind of crises. In this paper, we investigate empirically whether the link...

We develop a simple model of banking regulation with two policy instruments: minimum capital requirements and the supervision of domestic banks. The regulator faces a trade-off: high capital requirements cause a drop in the banks’ profitability, whereas strict supervision reduces the scope of...

In moral hazard models, bank shareholders have incentives to transfer wealth from the deposit insurer - that is, maximize put option value - by pursuing riskier strategies. For safe banks with large charter value, however, the risk-taking incentive is outweighed by the possibility of losing...