Under the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), introduced in 2014, systemically important euro area banks with combined assets of about 21,000 billion euros are directly supervised by the ECB. We examine from a static and a dynamic perspective how this fundamental shift to unified supervision...

This paper is motivated by the implementation of the new banking supervision structure in the European Union (EU) and the possible conflict of interest between monetary policy and the supervision authority within the European Central Bank (ECB). The empirical analysis considers the relationship...

This paper analyzes cooperation between sovereign national authorities in the supervision and regulation of a multinational bank. We take a political economy approach to regulation and assume that supervisors maximize the welfare of their own country. The communication between the supervisors is...

In the context of current debates about the proper form of prudential regulation and proposals for the imposition of liquidity and capital ratios, the paper examines Hyman Minsky’s work as a consultant to government agencies exploring financial regulatory reform in the 1960s. As the...

In the light of the recent financial market turmoil, this paper focuses on liquidity risk management from the point of view of both supervisory authorities and large financial institutions. This research aims at pointing out the main differences between national regulations and supervisory...

We study whether central bank independence (CBI) and monetary policy arrangements can jointly influence the likelihood of policymakers assigning banking supervision to central banks. Our empirical analysis shows that, assuming a benevolent government, a higher degree of central bank operational...

Banking union is the most ambitious European project undertaken since the introduction of the single currency. It was launched in the summer of 2012, in order to send the markets a strong signal of unity against a looming financial fragmentation problem that was putting the euro on the ropes....

A healthy and stable banking system resilient to financial crises is a prerequisite for sustainable growth. Minimization of a) the associated systemic risk and b) of the contagion effect in a banking crisis is a necessary condition to achieve this goal. The Central Bank is in charge of this...

The question of why some countries suffer from crises, while some others can escape from them, is challenging. Empirical evidence suggests that countries with stronger financial institutions are more durable to the wind of crises. In this paper, we investigate empirically whether the link...