The systemic risk potential in the European banking market has increased. Hence, the following questions emerge: Is there a need for a truly European supervisory framework? And, how should a potential European supervisor be organised? This paper evaluates the existing supervisory framework as...

Globalisierungsprozesse erzeugen Problemlagen, die allein durch nationalstaatliche Intervention nicht mehr zu bewältigen sind. Pessimistische Szenarien schließen daraus auf ein generelles "Steuerungsversagen" des Nationalstaates mit der Folge einer wettbewerblichen Deregulierung von...

Operationelle Risiken stellen für Banken nach dem Kreditrisiko die zweitwichtigste Risikokategorie dar. Ein effektives Risikomanagement der operationellen Risiken dürfte in Zukunft ein entscheidender Wettbewerbsfaktor sein. Im Rahmen der Neuregelung der bankaufsichtsrechtlichen Vorgaben...

Banking supervision requires regular inspection and assessment of financial institutions. In Germany this task is carried out by the central bank ('Deutsche Bundesbank, BBK') in cooperation with the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority ('Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht,...

To test if safety nets create moral hazard in the banking industry, we develop a simultaneous structural two-equations model that specifies the probability of a bailout and banks' risk taking.We identify the effect of expected bailout probabilities on risk taking using exclusion restrictions...

The European Commission's approach to the supervision and restructuring of the EU banking system has numerous shortcomings. As an alternative, this article proposes a European Resolution Authority and a European Restructuring Fund for systemically important banks and the implementation of a levy...

I review the state of the art of the academic theoretical and empirical literature on the potential trade-off between competition and stability in banking. There are two basic channels through which competition may increase instability: by exacerbating the coordination problem of...

The present discussions about the future of bank regulation, coming after a long period of bank deregulation, have a natural tendency to exaggerate the effectiveness of regulation. But those discussions are poorly rooted in the macroeconomic foundations of bank intermediation, including its...

We examine the prudential implications of the co-existence between the standardized approach and the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, as defined in the new Basle Accord. We consider a model in which sophisticated banks, eligible for the IRB approach, and unsophisticated banks, eligible for...