to be held on bank portfolios, rather than sold. I measure the capital ratio (the inverse of the leverage ratio, defined … as equity divided by asset value) for each bank at the time of each loan's origination. After controlling for both bank … results are robust to an instrumental variables strategy for predicting bank capital, a wide range of measures of bank capital …

mechanisms and capital regulations are the determinants of the bank performance …

Since increasing a bank's capital requirement to improve the stability of the financial system imposes costs upon the … bank, a regulator should ideally be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that banks classified as systemically risky …

This paper investigates the causal effects of voluntary information disclosures on a bank's expected default … probability, enterprise risk, and value. I measure disclosure via a self-constructed index for the largest 80 U.S. bank holding … companies for the period 1998-2011. I provide evidence that a bank's management responds to a plausibly exogenous deterioration …

We present a model where bank assets are a portfolio of risky debt claims and analyze stockholders' risk …-taking behavior while considering the strategic interaction between debtors and creditors. We find that: (1) as the leverage of a bank … demonstrates that an increase in comovement of a loan portfolio increases the bank's cost of default directly, we find that the …

banking corporate governance: risk management, ownership structure and executive compensation of banks. Best practices for …

This study examines the effect of shareholder taxes on bank risk-taking. Economic theory predicts that personal tax … tax rates are positively (negatively) associated with bank risk-taking when shareholders can (cannot) share in risk with … income taxes plays an important role in bank risk-taking …

We investigate the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large US … bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (i.e. 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk while … bank shareholders have preference for ‘excessive' risk. Likewise, the market power is the centre piece of any bank …

We investigate the effects of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large U ….S. bank holding companies over the period 1997-2004 (comprising 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer … less risk, while bank shareholders prefer higher risk, and market power is the centerpiece of any bank regulation. However …