The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously...

This paper discusses the relationship between bank size and risk-taking under Pillar I of the New Basel Capital Accord. Using a model with imperfect competition and moral hazard, we find that small banks (and hence small borrowers) may profit from the introduction of an internal ratings based...

The Scale-Efficiency version of the Efficient-Structure Hypothesis and the Structure-Conduct-Performance Hypothesis find empirical support in German banking data from 1998 to 2002. Due to the acceptance of the two hypotheses and the existence of overall economies of scale, we conclude that...

In this paper, we investigate whether bank competition increases risk taking for the case of the Tunisian banks. Our data set covers nine Tunisian banks observed during the period from1980 to 2009 and we conducted an econometric model based on panel data estimations. The econometric results...

This study provides rigorous empirical evidence that an increase in market power of dominant banks within deposit markets does not necessarily translate into attenuation of non-dominant banks' capacity for funding of loan commitments. This is evident in the finding that while non-dominant banks...

In this study, we assess whether banking system concentration is strongly linked to banks credit risk exposure. We use a sample of 138 commercial banks drawn from SADC countries between 1999 and 2005. The results exhibit no significant influence of concentration on four measures of credit...

A common assumption in the academic literature is that franchise value plays a key role in limiting bank risk-taking. As market power is the primary source of franchise value, reduced competition in banking markets has been seen as promoting banking stability. We test this hypothesis using data...

The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously...

We analyze the relationship between bank size and risk-taking under the New Basel Capital Accord. Using a model with imperfect competition and moral hazard, we show that the introduction of an internal ratings based (IRB) approach improves upon flat capital requirements if the approach is...

We use a dynamic panel data model to analyze bank-specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank risk for a large sample of commercial banks operating in the euro area. The selected time span, from 2001 to 2012, considers the impact of the on-going financial and economic crisis on the Eurozone...