We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of capital requirements on bank risk taking, commercial bank failure, and market structure. We propose a market structure where big, dominant banks interact with small, competitive fringe banks. Banks accumulate...

We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of capital requirements on equilibrium bank risk taking, commercial bank failure, interest rates on loans, and market structure. We propose a market structure where big banks with market power interact with small,...

We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of regulatory policies on bank risk taking and market structure as well as the feedback effect of market structure on the efficacy of policy. Since our model is matched to U.S. data, we propose a market structure...

We develop a model of banking industry dynamics to study the quantitative impact of capital requirements on equilibrium bank risk taking, commercial bank failure, interest rates on loans, and market structure. We propose a market structure where big banks with market power interact with small,...

Banking regulation routinely designates some assets as safe and thus does not require banks to hold any additional capital to protect against losses from these assets. A typical such safe asset is domestic government debt. There are numerous examples of banking regulation treating domestic...