The authors study banking using the tools of mechanism design, without a priori assumptions about what banks are, who they are, or what they do. Given preferences, technologies, and certain frictions - including limited commitment and imperfect monitoring - they describe the set of incentive...

We provide a summary and an overview of the papers presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland’s 2004 Workshop on Money, Banking, and Payments, held during the weeks of August 3-7 and August 23-27, 2004.

This Policy Discussion Paper summarizes the papers presented at the 2006 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, and Payments. Every summer since 2002, some of the best researchers in the areas of theory, policy, and quantitative analysis relating to money, banking, and payments systems have met in...

This PDP summarizes the papers presented at the 2005 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, and Payments at the Cleveland Fed. Papers covered a wide variety of topics in monetary theory and policy, banking, and payments systems research. Topics ranged from optimal monetary policy, optimal bank...

The 2007 Summer Workshop on Money, Banking, Payments and Finance met at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland this summer, as we have over the past several years. The following document summarizes and ties together the contributions presented at the workshop this year.

The Federal Reserve abandoned foreign-exchange-market intervention because it conflicted with the System’s commitment to price stability. By the early 1980s, economists generally concluded that, absent a portfolio-balance channel, sterilized foreign-exchange-market intervention did not provide...

The authors construct a simple environment that combines a limited communication friction and a limited information friction in order to generate a role for money and intermediation. They ask whether there is any reason to expect the emergence of a banking sector (i.e., institutions that combine...

Should monetary policy respond to asset prices? This paper analyzes this question from the vantage point of equilibrium determinacy.

We modify the Diamond-Dybvig model studied in Green and Lin to incorporate a self-interested banker who has a private record-keeping technology. A public record-keeping device does not exist. We find that there is a trade-off between sophisticated contracts that possess relatively good...

It is well known that sunspot equilibria may arise under an interest-rate operating procedure in which the central bank varies the nominal rate with movements in future inflation (a forward-looking Taylor rule). This paper demonstrates that these sunspot equilibria may be learnable in the sense...