Part I: Theoretical foundations of bargaining research -- Chapter 1: Field Experiments in Bargaining -- Chapter 2: Commitment Tactics in Bargaining -- Chapter 3: The Role of Emotions in Bargaining -- Chapter 4: New Empirical Perspectives on Bargaining -- Chapter 5: Reputational Bargaining --...

In this article we define and characterize a class of asymmetric leximin solutions, that contains both the symmetric leximin solution of Imai[5] and the two-person asymmetric Kalai-Smorodinsky solution of Dubra [3] as special cases. Solutions in this class combine three attractive features: they...

We study a bargaining model with a disagreement game between offers and counteroffers. In order to characterize the set of its subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs, we provide a recursive technique that relies on the Pareto frontier of equilibrium payoffs. When players have different time...