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Delays and partial agreements in multi-issue bargaining
Acharya, Avidit; Ortner, Juan - In: Journal of Economic Theory 148 (2013) 5, pp. 2150-2163
We model a situation in which two players bargain over two pies, one of which can only be consumed starting at a future date. Suppose the players value the pies asymmetrically: one player values the existing pie more than the future one, while the other player has the opposite valuation. We show...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010702848
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Disagreement and authority
Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - 2007
Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263800
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Auctions with Limited Commitment
Liu, Qingmin; Mierendorff, Konrad; Shi, Xianwen - University of Toronto, Department of Economics - 2013
commitment power to withhold an unsold object off the market. The seller has a single object and can conduct an infinite sequence … commitment through an auxiliary mechanism design problem with full commitment, in which an additional constraint reflects the … limit as the period length vanishes. The static full commitment profit is not achievable but the seller can always guarantee …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010850116
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Tough negotiations: Bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - In: Games and Economic Behavior 87 (2014) C, pp. 353-366
attrition: Negotiators initially commit to incompatible offers, but agreement occurs once a negotiator's commitment decays. If …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931181
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Disagreement and Authority
Ellingsen, Tore; Miettinen, Topi - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationality of the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affrmative. When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost, the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090592
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MULTILATERAL BARGAINING WITH CONCESSION COSTS
Caruana, Guillermo; Einav, Liran; Quint, Daniel - Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) - 2004
This paper presents a new non-cooperative approach to multilateral bargaining. We consider a demand game with the following additional ingredients: (i) There is an exogenous deadline, by which bargaining has to end; (ii) Prior to the deadline, players may sequentially change their demands as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168663
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The Evolution of Bargaining Behavior
Ellingsen, Tore - Economics Institute for Research (SIR), … - 1995
commitment and flexibility. When the pie's size is certain, evolution favors the "fair" strategy; accept any share greater than …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005649254
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Bargaining with revoking costs
Dutta, Rohan - In: Games and Economic Behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 144-153
A simple two stage bilateral bargaining game is analyzed. The players simultaneously demand shares of a unit size pie. If the demands add up to more than one, the players simultaneously choose whether to stick to their demand or accept the otherʼs offer. While both parties sticking to their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011049846
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Bilateral Oligopoly
Björnerstedt, Jonas; Stennek, Johan - 2001
In intermediate goods markets, both buyers and sellers normally have market power, and sales are based on bilaterally negotiated contracts specifying both price and quantity. In our model, pairs of buyers and sellers meet in bilateral but interdependent Rubinstein-Ståhl negotiations. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334737
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Immediate Agreement in Interdependent Bilateral Bargaining
Björnerstedt, Jonas; Stennek, Johan - 2007
This note provides sufficient conditions for immediate agreement in an extensive form model of interdependent bilateral bargaining. The model is suggested by Björnerstedt and Stennek (2006) as a work horse for studying bilateral oligopoly. The key feature of this model is that the firms are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320169