In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy, wages are set through axiomatic bargaining a`la Nash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor augmentations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy 1964, and more recently Funk 2002). The...

I study a model of growth and income distribution in which workers and firms bargain à la Nash (Econometrica 18(2):155–162, <CitationRef CitationID="CR39">1950</CitationRef>) over wages and productivity gains, taking into account the trade-offs faced by firms in choosing factor-augmenting technologies. The aggregate environment...</citationref>

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy, wages are set through axiomatic bargaining a`la Nash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor augmentations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy 1964, and more recently Funk 2002). The...

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy, wages are set through axiomatic bargaining a la Nash [1950]. As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor augmentations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction (Kennedy [1964], and more recently Funk [2002])....

In a simple one-sector, two-class, fixed-proportions economy operating at full capacity, wages are set through generalized axiomatic bargaining à laNash (1950). As for choice of technology, firms choose the direction of factor-augmenting innovations to maximize the rate of unit cost reduction...

In a simple one-sector economy operating at full capacity, workers and firms bargain a la Nash (1950) over wages and productivity gains taking into account the trade-offs faced by firms in choosing factor-augmenting technolo- gies. The aggregate environment that arises from self-interested...